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Abstract: Studies have documented that average stock returns for small, low-stock-price firms are higher in
January than for the rest of the year. Two explanations have received a great deal of attention: the tax-loss selling
hypothesis and the gamesmanship hypothesis. This paper documents that seasonality in returns is not a
phenomenon observed only for small firms’ stock or those with low prices. Strong seasonality in excess returns
is reported for a sample of widely followed firms. Sample firms have unusually low excess returns in January,
and returns adjust upward over the remainder of the year. These results are consistent with the gamesmanship
hypothesis but not the tax-loss-selling hypothesis. As financial institutions rebalance their portfolios in January
to sell the stock of highly visible and low-risk firms, there is downward price pressure in January. In addition, the
results suggest that firm visibility explains why seasonality in returns is related to firm size and stock price. Once
we control for visibility, market value and uncertainty do not appear to be important determinants of seasonality.
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I. Introduction
Historically average stock returns in January are higher than for the rest of the year.  
Empirical findings show that the January anomaly is related to firm size and share price, with
returns being higher in January for small firms and firms with low stock prices.   Although no
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explanation for the seasonal pattern in stock prices is universally accepted, two hypotheses
have received a great deal of attention:  the tax-loss selling hypothesis and the gamesmanship
hypothesis.  According to the tax-loss selling hypothesis, returns are high on some stocks
because tax-loss selling diminishes in January (Reinganum (1983), Roll (1983)).  At year-end,
investors sell stocks that have fallen in price over the year in order to realize capital losses.  In
contrast, the gamesmanship hypothesis suggests that institutions rebalance portfolio holdings in
order to “window dress” or influence performance-based renumeration (Haugen and
Lakonishok (1988)).  The tax-loss-selling hypothesis centers on how the behavior of individual
investors affects market dynamics whereas the focus of the gamesmanship explanation is on
institutional investors.  In either case, the stock of small and risky firms is subject to selling
pressure at year-end which reverses in January and is replaced by buying pressure.  Both
hypotheses have received some empirical support, though it is not clear that investors can
profit from the January anomaly because of transactions costs and the bid-ask bias (Bhardwaj
and Brooks (1992)).
Seasonality in returns is not a phenomenon observed only for small firms’ stock or
those with low prices.  In fact, strong seasonality in excess returns is reported for a sample of
widely followed firms, regardless of market capitalization or the degree of uncertainty2
surrounding the firm.  This seasonality, however, is opposite in direction to that reported for
small, less visible, low stock price firms.  Our sample firms have unusually low excess returns
in January and returns adjust upward over the remainder of the year.  This result holds even
for the lowest quartile of sample firms based on market value and provides empirical support
for the gamesmanship hypothesis.  Both the tax-loss-selling and the gamesmanship hypotheses
suggest that average stock returns are higher in January for small, risky firms but only the
gamesmanship hypothesis further predicts that the average returns for highly visible firms are
lower in January as compared to the other months of the year.  In addition, the results suggest
that firm visibility, rather than firm size or price, drives excess returns in January.  Institutions
buy lesser-known, risky, or poorly performing stock at the start of the year and rebalance their
portfolios near year end to include the stock of more visible, highly followed firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides development
of the research hypothesis.  Section III discusses the sample selection methods and Section IV
reports the empirical results.  The final section provides a discussion of the results and
direction for future research.
II. Hypothesis Development
One of the most puzzling mysteries in Finance is the finding that the average stock
return in the month of January is higher than in any other month of the year, the so-called
January effect.  This seasonal pattern has been documented in the U.S. (Rozeff and Kinney
(1976), Keim (1983)) and around the world (Gultekin and Gultekin (1983), Berges,
McConnell, and Schlarbaum (1984)).  Although many have attempted to explain this empirical3
finding, no theory is universally excepted.  Proposed explanations include the tax-loss selling
hypothesis and the gamesmanship hypothesis.
The tax-loss selling hypothesis explains the January effect as follows.  Investors sell
stock whose prices have already fallen during the year in order to realize capital losses and
take advantage of the resulting tax benefits.   This selling pressure depresses the prices of these
stocks even further.  In January selling pressure diminishes and stock prices return to
equilibrium values (Roll (1983)).
A second explanation of the observed seasonality in returns is the gamesmanship
hypothesis.  Some argue that institutional investors systematically rebalance portfolio holdings
throughout the year in order to “window dress” or affect performance-based renumeration
(Haugen and Lakonishok (1988), Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991)). 
Empirical evidence in Canada and the U.S. provides some support for this argument
(Athanassakos (1992),  Cuny, Fedenia, and Haugen (1996)).  Large institutional investors are
net buyers of risky securities at the beginning of the year when they are less concerned about
including well-known securities in their portfolios or they are trying to outperform
benchmarks.  Over the year, portfolios are rebalanced when returns are locked in.  Portfolio
managers remove lesser-known, risky, or poorly performing stock from their portfolios and
replace these stocks with well-known and less risky stocks with solid recent performance. 
Additional evidence of selling pressure at year-end and buying pressure in January is provided
by Ritter (1988).
Previous empirical studies have documented that the January effect is a small firm, low
stock price effect.  For example, Keim (1983) finds that roughly one-half of the annual small4
firm premium documented by Banz (1981) occurred during the month of January.  Blume and
Stambaugh (1989) also report evidence that is consistent with the conclusion that the size effect
is concentrated in January.  Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) conclude that something causes
upward pressure on prices of small firms’ stock at the turn of the year which does not seem to
affect large capitalization stocks.  This small firm, low stock price effect is consistent with
both the tax-loss selling and gamesmanship hypotheses.
In this paper, we examine whether seasonality is present in the returns of highly
followed firms.  If the gamesmanship hypothesis is correct, not only should we observe
seasonality in the returns of small firms and low-priced stock, but also in the returns of highly
followed firms.  As portfolio managers sell lesser-known or poorly performing stock during
the year, they buy the stock of firms that are well-known.   At the end of the year, managers
do not want their clients to see “‘marginal’ investments in the portfolio they’ve never heard of
before” (Haugen and Lakonishok (1988, p. 97)).  Instead, they rebalance the portfolio so that
it contains stock in highly visible and less risky firms.  Thus, we expect to observe seasonality
in returns for a sample of firms that are highly followed but opposite in direction to that
reported for samples of small, low stock price firms.  Average return in January is expected to
be lower than in other months of the year.  On the other hand, if the January effect results
from tax-loss selling, we expect to find no seasonality in the stock returns of firms with high
visibility.  Tax-loss-selling is associated with individual investors who tend to hold low
capitalization stocks (Ritter, 1988).  Institutional investors, on the other hand, concentrate their
portfolios on larger, more visible firms (Blume and Friend, 1986).  Thus, in general, the stock
of highly visible firms should not be subject to any buying or selling pressure for the purposes5
of tax-loss-selling.
Our research hypothesis is:
H : There is no seasonal pattern in the returns of highly visible firms. 0
The results of our examination of this hypothesis provide insight into why previous studies
have reported a positive relationship between seasonality and stock price or seasonality and
firm size.  Firms with low stock prices and small capitalization are likely to have little
visibility.  These are the stocks institutional investors sell at year-end and/or buy after the turn
of the year according to the gamesmanship hypothesis.
To test the research hypothesis that there is no seasonality in the returns of highly
visible firms, we choose a sample of highly followed firms. We use the number of analysts
following the firm in order to differentiate visible firms:  if a firm is followed by many
professional financial analysts it is likely to be highly visible. 
III. Sample Selection
Analyst following, forecasts, and earnings data are obtained from the Institutional
Brokers Estimate System (IBES) for each year of the 1980 through 1991 sample period.  The
firms included in the final sample passed through several filters.  The criteria follow:
(1.) The CRSP database includes returns data.
(2.) At least three individual forecasts determine the median forecast of earnings
per share.6
(3.) The IBES database includes consensus forecasts for at least nine years
starting in 1980 and for twenty consecutive months starting in June of the year
prior to the forecast year and ending in January of the subsequent year.
(4.) The company's fiscal year ends in December.
The final sample contains 19,783 observations for 167 firms representing 29 industries
classified by two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.  We compute monthly
returns by compounding the daily returns for each firm using holding-period returns and
excess return series.  We obtain daily raw and beta excess returns from the CRSP database.
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In Table I we provide sample firm information for the overall sample, as well as
quartiles determined by the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts (in panel A) and
quartiles determined by market value (in panel B).  We report sample statistics for these two
sets of quartiles in order to shed light on whether there are differences in firm uncertainty or
across firm size.   Average analyst following is substantial for the overall sample and all
3
quartiles.  Consistent with prior research, the mean of the consensus forecasts exceeds the
mean of actual earnings suggesting that analysts are optimistic in their earnings predictions for
the overall sample (e.g., Ali, Klein, and Rosenfeld (1992)).  Table I also reports the mean of
the standard deviation of the individual analysts' forecasts scaled by price used to construct the
consensus forecast (F(FEPS)).  Finally, the table reports the mean price and market value. 
Given that these firms are very visible and highly followed, many are large.  Note, however,
that a large number of sample firms are of small to moderate capitalization.  We get some
perspective on size by considering the size of firms included in small cap indexes.  For





market value $511 million.   The smallest firm included in the Wilshire index had market
4
capitalization of $89 million and the largest $1,461 million suggesting that many of our sample
firms can be classified as small.
5
IV. Methodology and Empirical Results
In order to test our research hypothesis and examine the seasonal pattern in returns for
the sample of highly followed firms, we estimate the pooled cross-sectional, time series model
where R  is the time t (excess or raw) return for firm i and D  is a dummy variable taking the i,t                          j,t
value of one for month j and zero otherwise.  The constant, " , is the average sample return in 0
January and the coefficients of the dummy variables, ",  measure differences in monthly j
returns from the January base.  Seasonal dummy variables are reported for the overall sample,
as well as quartiles determined by the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled
by price (F(FEPS)).   This standard deviation is a measure of analysts' uncertainty regarding
6
the firm.  Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) show that analysts’ optimism regarding a firm’s
earnings is related to the level of uncertainty surrounding the firm and that portfolio strategies
based on these observations can generate abnormal returns.  We examine seasonality by
quartile to see if a relationship exists between the level of uncertainty and seasonality.  We
first rank the firms in ascending order according to F(FEPS) and then divide them into four
quartiles of equal size.  The first quartile (Q1) contains the firms with the lowest standard8
deviation and the fourth (Q4) contains those with the highest standard deviation.  We partition
into quartiles using the standard deviation for June of the year prior to the forecast year, rather
than the standard deviation over the entire sample period.  As a result, a firm's membership in
a quartile can vary from forecast year to forecast year as its standard deviation changes over
time.
Table II reports the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for the raw
returns series.  The table reports t-statistics below each estimated dummy coefficient.  For the
overall sample, the typical seasonal pattern in returns is evident.  Returns in January are higher
than the remainder of the year.  The January dummy is positive and significantly different
from zero and all other dummies are negative, though not all are significant.  The final row
reports an F-statistic which tests the null hypothesis of no difference across months.  The null
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level in all cases.  An examination of the
estimates for the quartiles by standard deviation is not suggestive of a relationship between
uncertainty and seasonality.
7
Table III reports the results of OLS regressions for excess returns series.   Strong
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seasonality in excess returns is documented:  January returns are significantly lower than in all
other months.  The pattern holds across the four quartiles, though not every month’s dummy
differs significantly from zero.  This pattern in returns is opposite to that reported for samples
of small, low-priced stock.  Rather than earning positive abnormal returns in January, the
sample of highly-followed firms earned negative abnormal returns.
To investigate whether there is a relationship between firm size and seasonality for our
sample of highly followed firms, we also estimated dummy variable regressions for each9
market value quartile.  Clearly visibility and firm size are closely related.  Thus, our sample
contains many large firms.  Keim (1983) showed that the average excess return for large firms
is negative in January.  However, our sample also contains many firms with relatively
moderate capitalization as the sample statistics reported in Table I suggest.  The results
reported in Table IV indicate that the pattern does not vary across market value quartiles.  In
addition, within each market value quartile, we estimated the dummy variables regression for
each standard deviation quartile.  As discussed previously, the standard deviation quartiles are
determined by the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts standardized by price which
measures the amount of uncertainty surrounding the firm.  Tables V and VI report the results
for the largest and smallest market value quartiles.  For the large firms, the returns pattern
discussed previously is observed for each standard deviation quartile:  returns in January are
lower than the rest of the year.  However, for the smallest market value quartile, the pattern
begins to unravel for the high uncertainty (standard deviation) quartile.  This cross-section
contains the firms in our sample with the lowest analyst following and they have the smallest
market value and highest uncertainty.   The seasonal return pattern for these firms begins to
9
resemble the usual seasonal pattern reported for small firms.
VI. Discussion of Results and Conclusion
This paper documents that seasonality in returns is not a phenomenon observed only for
small firms’ stock or those with low prices.  For a sample of widely-followed firms strong
seasonality in excess returns is reported.  In contrast to results reported by previous studies of
seasonal returns patterns in the stock of small, low stock price firms, the firms in our sample10
have unusually low excess returns in January and returns adjust upward over the remainder of
the year.  This result holds across uncertainty and market value quartiles.  Thus, once we
control for visibility, market value and uncertainty do not appear to be important determinants
of seasonality.
Explanations for observed seasonal patterns in stock prices can be evaluated in light of
these results.  The tax-loss-selling hypothesis asserts that high returns in January on small
firm, low-priced stock results from selling pressure at year-end.  We expect no seasonality in
the stock of large firms if this hypothesis explains seasonal patterns.  However, under the
gamesmanship hypothesis, we would expect to see the seasonal pattern reported in this paper
for highly-followed firms.  As financial institutions rebalance their portfolios in January to sell
the stock of highly visible firms acquired toward the end of the previous year, there is
downward price pressure in January.  This downward pressure is alleviated over the year.  Our
results suggest that gamesmanship is an important determinant of the seasonal pattern in stock
returns.
Earlier studies have shown that seasonality in stock returns is related to stock price and
firm size.  In this paper, we show that it is visibility that may explain why firm size and stock
price matter.  Firms with little visibility are likely to be firms with small market values and
low stock prices, whereas firms with much visibility tend to be those with large market values
and high stock prices.  Our sample of highly visible and heavily followed firms contains both
large firms and those with more moderate capitalization.  Our results suggest that stock return
seasonality results from the behavior of institutional investors.  These investors rebalance their
portfolios by increasing investment in the stock of riskier and less visible firms at the11
beginning of the year and adjusting the portfolio composition to include more visible firms at
year-end.
Institutional investors are a large force in the U.S. market and their behavior has a
significant impact on stock price movements.  The results reported in this paper indicate that
institutional investors are the dominant force in the U.S. market, despite the fact that
individual investors own more than one-half of U.S. stocks.   Future research may investigate
10
other aspects of institutional investors’ behavior and whether these investors are the dominant
force in other markets.12
1. The January anomaly has been documented in many studies including Banz (1981), Blume
and Stambaugh (1983), Keim (1983), Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield (1989), and Bhardwaj and
Brooks (1992).
2. The CRSP daily excess return is the excess of the daily return above the return on a portfolio of
stocks with similar risk.  Benchmark portfolios are defined using portfolio rankings determined by
beta values (beta excess return) for the entire population of firms included in the CRSP database. 
Recent evidence supports the use of beta as a measure of risk (Pettengill, Sundaram, and Mathur
(1995)).  The CRSP database also contains a second excess returns series which uses the standard
deviation of holding period returns to form benchmark portfolios.  The results reported
subsequently are similar when this returns series is used.
3. Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) use the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts to
proxy for the level of uncertainty associated with a firm.  They show that analysts’ earnings
forecasts are overly-optimistic for firms with a high level of uncertainty but little or no optimism
exists when uncertainty is low.
4. See the July 1993 Chicago Board of Trade Supplement.
5. Gitman (1996) provides further perspective on size.  He classifies firms with capitalization of
less than $500 million as small, $500 to $2 or $3 billion as medium, and more than $2 or $3 billion
as large.  Fifty percent of our sample firms have capitalization less than $2.38 billion at the end of
1992.
6. We divide the firms into quartiles determined by the standard deviation of the individual
analysts' earnings estimates (F(FEPS)) as of June of the year prior to the earnings forecast.  
7. We also examined raw returns by market value quartiles and there was no relationship between
capitalization and seasonality.
8. As noted in endnote 2, the excess return is the excess of the monthly return above the return on
a portfolio of stocks with similar risk.  Thus, we compare the returns for our sample of highly
followed firms to those of the CRSP benchmark which will contain, on average, firms with lower
visibility.
9. See quartiles Q4(High) and MV1(Low) in Table I.
10. See the Wall Street Journal, “Institutional Share of U.S. Equities Slip,” December 8, 1993,
pages C1:4 and C21:2.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Means for the full sample and quartiles determined by the standard deviation of analysts’
earnings forecasts (F(FEPS)) scaled by price
Overall Q1 (Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (High)
Number of 18.6576 19.8022 18.3765 18.4636 17.9873
analysts
Earnings 2.6376 2.0370 2.7484 2.9054 2.8602
forecasts
Actual earnings 2.4481 2.3889 2.7642 2.7348 1.9035
F(FEPS) 0.0076 0.0010 0.0028 0.0059 0.0206
Price 40.0724 53.4108 42.3740 34.2527 30.2172
Market Value 3905.4423 5442.0482 4214.6056 3654.4718 2306.6088
(in millions)
Panel B: Means for quartiles determined by market value
MV1 (Low) MV2 MV3 MV4 (High)
Number of 15.2012 16.8960 18.9571 23.0231
analysts
Earnings 1.6593 2.5613 2.8199 3.8156
forecasts
Actual earnings 1.5402 2.4629 2.5825 3.4594
F(FEPS) 0.0114 0.0082 0.0068 0.0053
Price 25.7646 34.6687 42.5827 63.3372
Market Value 689.0178 1544.9207 2872.4009 8506.8577
(in millions)16
Table II
Tests for Monthly Seasonal Effects in Raw Returns
The table reports the results of dummy OLS regressions for a sample of returns for the 1980
through 1991 time period.  Seasonal dummy variables are estimated for the overall sample as well
as quartiles determined by the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by price. 
The table reports t-statistics in parentheses below each estimated seasonal dummy and, in the final
row, an F-test of the null hypothesis of no differences across months.
Month Overall Q1 (low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (High)
January 0.0282 0.0249 0.0279 0.0290 0.0299
(14.38) (5.99) (7.80) (7.74) (7.24)
February -0.0071 0.0028 -0.0045 -0.0028 -0.0190
(-2.58) (0.49) (-0.89) (-0.52) (-3.25)
March -0.0070 0.0109 -0.0100 -0.0162 -0.0094
(-2.54) (1.92) (-1.97) (-3.06) (-1.58)
April -0.0223 -0.0071 -0.0158 -0.0282 -0.0350
(-8.03) (-1.26) (-3.12) (-5.35) (-5.76)
May -0.0047 0.0080 -0.0039 -0.0116 -0.0089
(-1.68) (1.44) (-0.77) (-2.22) (-1.46)
June -0.0148 0.0001 -0.0058 -0.0205 -0.0318
(-5.33) (0.03) (-1.14) (-3.95) (-5.08)
July -0.0234 -0.158 -0.0166 -0.0199 -0.0409
(-8.46) (-2.89) (-3.27) (-3.78) (-6.55)
August -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0051 -0.0073 0.0045
(-1.22) (-0.69) (-1.01) (-1.37) (0.71)
September -0.0442 -0.0336 -0.0384 -0.0472 -0.0575
(-15.92) (-6.21) (-7.61) (-8.88) (-9.14)
October -0.0223 -0.0035 -0.0128 -0.0250 -0.0513
(-8.06) (-0.66) (-2.53) (-4.71) (-8.05)
November -0.0102 -0.0026 -0.0104 -0.0080 -0.0203
(-3.66) (-0.48) (-2.09) (-1.51) (-3.11)
December -0.0004 0.0121 0.0039 -0.0131 -0.0091
(-0.13) (2.30) (0.80) (-2.42) (-1.33)
F-statistic 43.21* 12.75* 9.38* 11.80* 18.56*17
Table III
Tests for Monthly Seasonal Effects in Excess Returns
The table reports the results of dummy OLS regressions for a sample of excess returns for the 1980 through 1991 time
period.  Excess returns are calculated using portfolio rankings determined by beta.  Seasonal dummy variables are
estimated for the overall sample as well as quartiles determined by the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts
scaled by price.  The table reports t-statistics in parentheses below each estimated seasonal dummy and, in the final row, 
an F-test of the null hypothesis of no differences across months.
Month Overall Q1 (Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (High)
January -0.0207 -0.0234 -0.0200 -0.0234 -0.0176
(-12.60) (-7.16) (-6.61) (-7.26) (-5.03)
February 0.0050 0.0143 0.0075 0.0087 -0.0059
(2.15) (3.13) (1.77) (1.90) (-1.18)
March 0.0066 0.0221 0.0030 0.0011 0.0035
(2.84) (4.93) (0.70) (0.25) (0.69)
April 0.0133 0.0277 0.0186 0.0119 -0.0015
(5.74) (6.28) (4.35) (2.63) (-0.30)
May 0.0194 0.0296 0.0211 0.0151 0.0142
(8.35) (6.73) (4.93) (3.35) (2.75)
June 0.0194 0.0320 0.0271 0.0187 0.0012
(8.36) (7.40) (6.31) (4.17) (0.23)
July 0.0264 0.0333 0.0317 0.0325 0.0091
(11.37) (7.74) (7.40) (7.19) (1.71)
August 0.0302 0.0269 0.0288 0.0323 0.0351
(12.99) (6.30) (6.74) (7.07) (6.60)
September 0.0195 0.0274 0.0227 0.0204 0.0082
(8.41) (6.44) (5.31) (4.46) (1.54)
October 0.0399 0.0557 0.0460 0.0400 0.0159
(17.19) (13.19) (10.74) (8.77) (2.95)
November 0.0203 0.0283 0.0193 0.0232 0.0098
(8.71) (6.71) (4.58) (5.06) (1.76)
December 0.0228 0.0305 0.0259 0.0172 0.0151
(9.79) (7.39) (6.21) (3.69) (2.61)
F-statistic 46.41* 19.11* 18.14* 14.65* 7.84*18
Table IV
Tests for Monthly Seasonal Effects in Excess Returns:
Market Value Quartiles
The table reports the results of dummy OLS regressions for a sample of returns for the 1980
through 1991 time period.  Excess returns are calculated using portfolio rankings determined by
beta.  Seasonal dummy variables are estimated for the overall sample as well as quartiles
determined by market value.  The table reports t-statistics in parentheses below each estimated
seasonal dummy and, in the final row, an F-test of the null hypothesis of no differences across
months.
Month Overall MV1 (Low) MV2 MV3 MV4 (High)
January -0.0207 -0.0226 -0.0194 -0.0199 -0.0211
(-12.60) (-5.78) (-5.91) (-6.30) (-7.40)
February 0.0050 0.0084 0.0018 0.0029 0.0070
(2.15) (1.53) (0.38) (0.65) (1.74)
March 0.0066 0.0115 0.0087 0.0027 0.0041
(2.84) (2.06) (1.89) (0.60) (1.03)
April 0.0133 0.0078 0.0130 0.0151 0.0167
(5.74) (1.41) (2.81) (3.41) (4.15)
May 0.0194 0.0238 0.0177 0.0200 0.0169
(8.35) (4.26) (3.84) (4.41) (4.22)
June 0.0194 0.0174 0.0143 0.0230 0.0221
(8.36) (3.10) (3.08) (5.18) (5.55)
July 0.0264 0.0115 0.0201 0.0324 0.0379
(11.37) (2.05) (4.33) (7.29) (9.57)
August 0.0302 0.0271 0.0291 0.0299 0.0336
(12.99) (4.78) (6.28) (6.74) (8.50)
September 0.0195 0.0204 0.0203 0.0146 0.0229
(8.41) (3.64) (4.34) (3.31) (5.74)
October 0.0399 0.0326 0.0366 0.0375 0.0511
(17.19) (5.84) (7.83) (8.44) (12.85)
November 0.0203 0.0180 0.0235 0.0188 0.0205
(8.71) (3.21) (5.03) (4.26) (5.16)
December 0.0228 0.0280 0.0255 0.0198 0.0192
(9.79) (4.94) (5.44) (4.49) (4.85)
F-statistic 46.41* 5.92* 10.70* 14.58* 26.92*19
Table V
Tests for Monthly Seasonal Effects in Excess Returns:
Large Firms by Standard Deviation Quartile
The table reports the results of dummy OLS regressions for a sample of returns for the 1980
through 1991 time period.  Excess returns are calculated using portfolio rankings determined by
beta.  Seasonal dummy variables are estimated for the overall sample as well as quartiles
determined by the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by price.  The table
reports t-statistics in parentheses below each estimated seasonal dummy and, in the final row, an
F-test of the null hypothesis of no differences across months.
Month Overall Q1 (Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (High)
January -0.0211 -0.0175 -0.0230 -0.0208 -0.0229
(-7.40) (-2.78) (-4.09) (-3.95) (-4.07)
February 0.0070 0.0135 0.0059 0.0005 0.0118
(1.74) (1.56) (0.75) (0.06) (1.51)
March 0.0041 0.0143 0.0046 -0.0044 0.0062
(1.03) (1.67) (0.59) (-0.57) (0.77)
April 0.0167 0.0201 0.0229 0.0152 0.0074
(4.15) (2.41) (2.89) (2.01) (0.91)
May 0.0169 0.0220 0.0175 0.0128 0.0160
(4.22) (2.66) (2.22) (1.71) (1.95)
June 0.0221 0.0291 0.0300 0.0195 0.0111
(5.55) (3.57) (3.83) (2.61) (1.36)
July 0.0379 0.0339 0.0430 0.0335 0.0390
(9.57) (4.19) (5.54) (4.53) (4.71)
August 0.0336 0.0175 0.0356 0.0373 0.0449
(8.50) (2.19) (4.62) (5.04) (5.33)
September 0.0229 0.0247 0.0250 0.0182 0.0184
(5.74) (3.09) (3.22) (2.43) (2.14)
October 0.0511 0.0590 0.0560 0.0463 0.0344
(12.85) (7.42) (7.33) (6.22) (3.90)
November 0.0205 0.0237 0.0194 0.0107 0.0233
(5.16) (3.01) (2.52) (1.41) (2.67)
December 0.0192 0.0183 0.0298 0.0137 0.0094
(4.85) (2.33) (4.01) (1.78) (1.05)
F-statistic 26.92* 7.36* 9.33* 8.30* 5.37*20
Table VI
Tests for Monthly Seasonal Effects in Excess Returns:
Small Firms by Standard Deviation Quartile
The table reports the results of dummy OLS regressions for a sample of returns for the 1980
through 1991 time period.  Excess returns are calculated using portfolio rankings determined by
beta.  Seasonal dummy variables are estimated for the overall sample as well as quartiles
determined by the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts scaled by price.  The table
reports t-statistics in parentheses below each estimated seasonal dummy and, in the final row, an
F-test of the null hypothesis of no differences across months.
Month Overall Q1 (Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 (High)
January -0.0226 -0.0277 -0.0256 -0.0280 -0.0137
(-5.78) (-3.82) (-3.91) (-3.67) (-1.54)
February 0.0084 0.0249 0.0258 0.0045 -0.0141
(1.53) (2.47) (2.82) (0.41) (-1.11)
March 0.0115 0.0314 0.0123 0.0163 -0.0084
(2.06) (3.23) (1.30) (1.48) (-0.66)
April 0.0078 0.0392 0.0044 0.0143 -0.0163
(1.41) (4.09) (.46) (1.29) (-1.27)
May 0.0238 0.0231 0.0338 0.0079 0.0252
(4.26) (2.39) (3.60) (0.69) (1.97)
June 0.0174 0.0381 0.0329 0.0131 -0.0117
(3.10) (4.02) (3.44) (1.16) (-0.88)
July 0.0115 0.0304 0.0307 0.0077 -0.0203
(2.05) (3.14) (3.15) (0.70) (-1.56)
August 0.0271 0.0282 0.0323 0.0330 0.0190
(4.78) (2.93) (3.27) (3.00) (1.42)
September 0.0204 0.0281 0.0360 0.0153 0.0033
(3.64) (2.93) (3.80) (1.35) (0.25)
October 0.0326 0.0565 0.0520 0.0292 -0.0038
(5.84) (5.90) (5.42) (2.60) (-0.30)
November 0.0180 0.0278 0.0238 0.0222 0.0013
(3.21) (2.94) (2.42) (1.96) (0.10)
December 0.0280 0.0411 0.0310 0.0308 0.0111
(4.94) (4.44) (3.22) (2.68) (0.78)
F-statistic 5.92* 3.99* 4.52* 1.76 2.20*